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Abstract.  This paper comments on Maria Baghramian’s ‘The Virtues of Relativism’. 
We agree that some relativist positions are naturally couched as ‘stances’ and that it 
is fruitful to connect relativism to virtue epistemology. But I find Baghramian’s 
preferred rendering of relativism uncharitable. 
 
 
I 
 
Introduction. Maria Baghramian’s paper, ‘The Virtues of Relativism’, contains a 
wealth of original observations and arguments. I will only be able to offer a few 
marginalia in response.  
 
II 
 
Debates and Wars. There are many debates over relativism. Some of them – for 
instance the controversy over ‘new-age’ semantic relativism – are conducted like 
most other philosophical disputes: scholarly, esoterically, and respectfully. Other 
debates surrounding relativism are different: they are ‘wars’. It is customary to speak 
of ‘wars’ either when intellectual exchanges become acrimonious (‘science wars’) or 
when one launches an intellectual campaign (‘war on cancer’). I submit that some 
discussions of relativism have the feel of ‘relativism wars’ or ‘wars on relativism’ (e.g. 
Boghossian 2006; Williamson 2015). 
 The relativism wars share the following features. First, they primarily concern 
forms of ontological or epistemic relativism. Second, contributors aim to reach a 
wider audience in academia and beyond. Third, the disputes are strikingly one-sided 
in that the critics of relativism vastly outnumber its proponents. Relativism is 
‘refuted’ over and over again, but only rarely defended. Fourth, the critics regularly 
link relativism to various social and political ills, for instance, to climate-change 
scepticism or Holocaust denials, to ‘post-truth politics’ or the ‘Taliban’. Relativists are 
portrayed as opening the floodgates to irrationality, while the critics fashion 
themselves as noble fighters for decency and reason. Fifth and finally, the relativistic 
positions under attack in these campaigns are not carefully distilled from a large 
corpus of philosophical writings; more typically, the critics construct what relativists 
had better be saying if they are to make any sense at all. This dismissive and 
patronizing attitude is helped by the fact that the alleged or card-carrying relativists 
either are not philosophers (e.g. David Bloor, Stanley Fish, or Barbara Herrnstein 
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Smith) or outwith the Anglophone philosophical mainstream (e.g. Lorraine Code, 
Jacques Derrida, Paul Feyerabend, Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Francois Lyotard, 
or Richard Rorty).  
 I find the relativism wars and the war on relativism deeply problematic. 
Whenever they take for granted that reason is exclusively on their side, and that 
they need to reach the public, academics are prone to allow themselves dubious 
intellectual shortcuts. They feel entitled to dispense with detailed and charitable 
reconstructions of their opponents’ positions and arguments; justified in giving more 
weight to moral signalling than to meticulous scholarship; and obliged to ignore their 
own allies’ sloppy interpretations and poor reasoning.  Applied to relativism: the 
urgency of the political goals of confronting and defeating climate-change scepticism 
and Holocaust denials is no excuse for suspending established canons of careful 
reading and arguing. Quick and dirty reflections directed at relativistic scarecrows do 
little to undermine politically unsavoury opponents. On the contrary, such 
reflections lower intellectual standards and enable the prophets of post-truth to 
dismiss philosophical reasoning as superficial propaganda.   
 It is to Baghramian’s credit that in her writings on relativism she has generally 
kept off the war-on-relativism band-wagon. Although critical of almost all versions of 
relativism, Baghramian has done her best to do justice to relativist positions by 
focusing on their apparent strengths as much as on their weaknesses.  
 
III 
 
Equal Validity. I shall now turn to the central issue on which Baghramian and I differ. 
Proponents and opponents of epistemic relativism tend to agree that the following 
five conditions have to be met for a position to qualify as relativistic:  
 
(1) DEPENDENCE: Judgements attributing an epistemic status to a person or belief 
(= ‘E-judgements’) are relative to epistemic standards. Sets of such standards 
form epistemic frameworks.   
(2) NON-ABSOLUTISM: None of these standards or frameworks is absolutely 
correct.1 
(3) PLURALITY: There is (or has been, or could be) more than one such framework. 
(4) CONFLICT: E-judgements of different epistemic frameworks can conflict. 
(5) NON-NEUTRALITY: When E-judgements (licensed by different standards of 
different frameworks) conflict, there are – at least in some important cases – no 
framework-independent, neutral ways of adjudication. 
 
While this much is generally agreed, many friends and foes of relativism do, 
however, disagree over a sixth condition:  
 
(6) EQUAL VALIDITY: The different epistemic frameworks (their standards and the 
judgements they license) are all equally valid.  
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Almost all card-carrying epistemic relativists deny being committed to EQUAL 
VALIDITY. And yet, anti-relativists invariably regard EQUAL VALIDITY as the very 
heart of relativism. Baghramian is a case in point2, writing for instance that:  
 
… the relativist is committed to … the ‘equal validity’ thesis – the claim that 
there can be more than one equally correct or true, but mutually  
incompatible, judgement on a given topic ... (p. 2) 
 
The relativist … gives equal credence to the truth (rational acceptability, 
justificatory standards) of differing positions and beliefs … (p. 9) 
 
In Baghramian’s case this is all the more surprising since she also notes in passing (p. 
7) that three paradigmatic card-carrying relativists – the sociologist of knowledge 
David Bloor, the feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code, and the epistemological 
anarchist Paul Feyerabend – deny any commitment to EQUAL VALIDITY. In the case 
of Bloor, Baghramian quotes his denial herself (Bloor 2011, p. 452): 
 
Bloor … objects to Boghossian’s characterization of his brand of relativism as an 
equal validity, rather he thinks that the relativists of the Edinburgh School treat 
all theses with equal curiosity. (p. 7) 
 
Note that this has been Bloor’s position since 1982:  
 
Our … postulate … is not that all beliefs are equally true or equally false, but that 
… all beliefs without exception call[..] for empirical investigation and must be 
accounted for by finding the specific, local causes of [their] credibility (Barnes 
and Bloor 1982, p. 23). 
 
Bloor even ridicules the idea that relativism is committed to EQUAL VALIDITY. He 
does so while praising the alethic relativism of the physicist-philosopher Philipp 
Frank, of Vienna-Circle fame. Reflecting on Frank’s 1952-book Wahrheit: Relativ 
oder Absolut?, Bloor poses this question about EQUAL VALIDITY:  
 
What is ‘equal validity’? According to this idea, the physics of Aristotle would, 
presumably, have ‘equal validity’ with the physics of Einstein. Now recall the 
theoretical physicist Philipp Frank. Ask yourself: Would the scientist and 
relativist who took over Einstein’s chair really believe such a thing? (2011, p. 
452) 
 
In her paper ‘Must a Feminist Be a Relativist After All?’ (1995), Code takes issue 
with Sandra Harding’s suggestion that, for the relativist, ‘no reasonable standards 
can or could in principle [...] adjudicate between one culture’s claim that the earth is 
flat and another culture’s claim that the earth is round’ (Harding 1991, p. 139; Code 
1995, p. 202). Code rejects this suggestion with reference to Ivan Karamazov’s ‘If god 
does not exist, everything is permitted’. Code points out that we today no longer 
draw this conclusion. And she suggests that we are able to do likewise concerning 
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our standards: from the fact that there are no absolute standards, it does not follow 
that there are no standards at all (1995, p. 203).  
 In Feyerabend’s case, the picture is more complex. In Against Method he 
regards as sceptical rather than anarchist-relativist the idea that ‘every view [is] 
equally good, or [is] equally bad’ (1975, p. 189). And he happily acknowledges that 
‘[we] can say today that Galileo was on the right track …’ (1975, p. 6) Such 
judgements are not absolute of course, but relative to our epistemic practice. So far 
from committing to EQUAL VALIDITY, Against Method is willing to accept only the 
following equality: to make progress, every system of thought sometimes needs 
‘irrational means such as propaganda, emotion, ad-hoc hypotheses, and appeal to 
prejudices of all kinds’ (1975, p. 154).  
 In later writings, Feyerabend distinguishes between forms of relativism he 
rejects, and forms of relativism he accepts. Interestingly enough, only the rejected 
forms involve EQUAL VALIDITY. Thus in Science in a Free Society (1978) Feyerabend 
distinguishes his own ‘political relativism’, that treats all cultures as politically equal, 
from so-called ‘philosophical relativism, that is, the thesis that all traditions [and] 
theories … are equally true or equally false …’ (1978, pp. 82-84) Conquest of 
Abundance rails against versions of relativism that treat cultures as ‘equally truthful 
messengers of reality’ or as ‘equally successful’ (1999, p. 122). Against all such views 
Feyerabend insists that ‘not all approaches to ‘reality’ are successful’ and that the 
success of cultures is ‘a matter of empirical record, not of philosophical definitions’ 
(1999, p. 215). The ‘new’ relativism of Conquest of Abundance is primarily 
ontological. Its core is the idea that ‘Ultimate Reality … is ineffable’ and that the 
theoretical posits of religion and science – be they elementary particles, be they 
Gods – are so many attempts to cope in one’s natural and social environment (1999, 
p. 145). But there is no suggestion here that all these theoretical posits are equally 
valid. 
 What shall we do in light of this textual evidence? Shall we say that Bloor, Code 
and Feyerabend are not relativists after all, on the grounds that they reject EQUAL 
VALIDITY? That would be a problematic move. After all, these three authors are 
amongst our central exemplars for relativism. Not to forget that other key card-
carrying relativists across the humanities – from Barbara Herrnstein Smith (2018: p. 
26) all the way to Hartry Field (2009: pp. 255-6) – also go to great lengths to distance 
their position from EQUAL VALIDITY. Note also that Christopher Herbert, the author 
of an extended study of ‘Victorian Relativity’, concludes a lengthy discussion of the 
issue with the remark: ‘Nowhere does any “relativist”, to my knowledge, assert that 
all views are equally valid …’  (Herbert 2001, loc. 440).  
 Of course, if we want to break the link between relativism and EQUAL VALIDITY, 
we need to first understand why this link can seem natural. I submit the absolutists’ 
underlying thought is as follows. The relativist says that all E-judgements are relative 
to epistemic frameworks. Assume that two such E-judgments, J1 and J2, based on 
two different epistemic frameworks, F1 and F2 respectively, contradict one another. 
The relativist endorses the following claim (*) concerning such situation:  
 
(*) J1 and J2 can, at best, be ‘relatively right,’ that is, right relative to their 
respective frameworks, F1 and F2. F1 and F2 in turn can also only be ‘relatively 
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right’: there is no way to evaluate them other than by using F1 and F2, or 
same other framework; and none of these frameworks is absolutely correct. 
 
Some absolutists think that to call J1, J2, F1 and F2 merely ‘relatively right’ is in fact to 
maintain that they are not right at all. And this makes it natural to claim that J1, J2, F1 
and F2 are equally valid: they are equally valid in not being valid. From the 
absolutist’s perspective this reading of the relativist’s position makes sense. But it 
does beg the argument against the relativist: for the relativist, the denial of absolute 
correctness is no denial of correctness per se. 
 Other absolutists reason differently. They focus on the fact that relativists see 
the structure of justification of J1 and J2 as parallel: J1 is justified in light of F1, and J2 
is justified in light of F2. Likewise for F1 and F2: both can be justified internally, F1 
from within F1, F2 from within F2, in parallel ways, say, by considerations of 
coherence, or based on intuition. As the absolutists see it, if the relativists take the 
structure of justification to be parallel in this way, then the relativists must also think 
of J1 and J2 on the one hand, and F1 and F2 on the other hand, as equally valid. Still, 
the relativist will demur here too: claims concerning the equal validity of epistemic 
frameworks presuppose a perspective beyond epistemic frameworks. But this is 
precisely the sort of perspective the relativist denies. All assessments of epistemic 
frameworks are framework-bound. And whether or not two epistemic frameworks 
are regarded as equally valid depends upon the standards of the evaluating 
framework.  
 Absolutists will not be satisfied with this answer. They will pose a further 
question: What can the relativist say about a situation in which her own epistemic 
framework, say F1, embodies epistemic relativism? Is the relativist not forced to 
accept F2 as equally valid? No. The relativist is committed to denying that her own – 
or indeed any other – framework is absolutely valid. But again, to insist that ‘not 
absolutely valid’ implies ‘equally valid’ just begs the question.   
 
IV 
 
Dogmas and Stances. In The Empirical Stance (2002), Bas van Fraassen suggests that 
at least some philosophical positions are primarily not ‘doctrines’ but ‘stances’, that 
is, bundles or systems of values, emotions, policies and preferences. This is not to 
deny that doctrines or beliefs can also be part and parcel of stances. And yet, within 
a stance, beliefs take second seat, and can be replaced without changing the 
commitments to values, emotions, policies and preferences. van Fraassen claims 
that empiricism and materialism are best understood as stances in this sense.  
 In two forthcoming book chapters (Kusch 2019a; 2019b) I have argued – without 
knowledge of Baghramian’s paper – that at least some forms of relativism are best 
rendered as stances. My cases in point are Bloor’s ‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’ 
and Feyerabend’s ‘epistemological anarchism’. I shall not repeat these 
interpretations here. I mention them only in order to underline the depth of my 
agreement with Baghramian’s main thesis. Still, in the spirit of fostering debate over 
the strengths and weaknesses of our proposals, I shall highlight three quibbles 
concerning Baghramian’s take.  
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 First, I think there is reason to prefer van Fraassen’s distinction between 
‘doctrine’ and ‘stance’ over Baghramian’s opposition between the ‘problems-of-
philosophy approach’ and the ‘philosophy-of-life approach’. On the problems-of-
philosophy approach, philosophy is ‘seen as the study of the most abstract and 
fundamental questions’; on the philosophy-of-life approach ‘the role of philosophy is 
to provide a framework and set of tools for thinking and living better’ (p. 3). This 
foregrounds a difference between fundamental and abstract questions on the one 
hand, and policies for research and living on the other hand. This makes it sound as if 
the former approach were concerned with deep and the latter with superficial 
issues. I am also unhappy with the very term ‘philosophy-of-life approach’. At least 
the German term ‘Lebensphilosophie’ is historically tainted because of its close 
association with forms of irrationalism, biologism and racism in late nineteenth-and-
early-twentieth century German-speaking philosophy, including the Nazi period. Of 
course, a good many philosophers think that relativism is tantamount to 
irrationalism – but we should not decide this issue by the choice of our terms.  
 Second, it is worth pointing out that characterizing relativism as a stance has 
often played a negative role. That is to say, absolutists have often portrayed 
relativism as a deeply problematic and dangerous ‘stance’ or ‘attitude’ towards 
politics, science, and rational conversation. Simon Blackburn for example, calls 
relativists ‘abusers of their mind and enemies of ours’ (2005, p. 139), ‘dehumanising’ 
(2005, p. 69), featuring a ‘soggy, tolerant, happy-clappy attitude’ (2005, p. xvi), 
‘monster[s]’ (2005, p. 68), or advocates of intellectual ‘perversions’ (2005, p. 137): 
 
The relativist reflection is dehumanising. Its attitude, including its light irony, is 
the stance of someone above the fray, someone who has seen through the 
debates and engagements of ordinary participants. But this stance is demeaning 
and impoverished … (Blackburn 2007, no page numbers). 
 
Or think of Zac, the muddle-headed relativist of Timothy Williamson’s Tetralogue 
(2015) who proclaims: ‘Sarah, you’re trying to reduce relativism to a formula. It’s 
more like an attitude to life.’ (2015, loc. 504-5) The core of this attitude is tolerance. 
Williamson lets Zac’s interlocutors trash this idea; one interlocutor gets to compare 
Zac’s stance to that of a rapist (2015, loc. 1429), another to that of a dishonest car 
salesman (2015, loc. 2190).   
 Call this the ‘negative use of the stance-idea’. Baghramian and I concur in trying 
out the opposite path, a ‘positive use’. We both choose the largely overlooked 
option of presenting relativism as a plausible stance of sorts and in a more positive 
light. But we should not forget that there is a further option in the neighbourhood of 
our efforts: the option of interpreting absolutism or anti-relativism as stances.3 
Absolutists too can believe that ‘the role of philosophy is to provide a framework 
and set of tools for thinking and living better’. They often put a high value on 
protecting the sciences and morality from social ills; they frequently commit to the 
idea of an unlimited undivided community of rational beings; they characteristically 
are fearful of anything that might seem to undermine the rule of reason; and they 
often oppose naturalism and empiricism. Right or wrong – first and foremost these 
are values, emotions, policies and preferences.  
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 My third and final comment on stances concerns not whether relativism or 
absolutism are stances, but whether taking all philosophical positions to be stances 
commits one to meta-philosophical relativism. Baghramian takes this to be obvious 
(p. 5). But it seems to me that it all depends on the degree to which one takes 
rationality to be internal to stances and variable from one stance to the next.4 van 
Fraassen himself ties the stance-idea to his ‘epistemic voluntarism’, a minimalist but 
absolutist conception of what rationality demands: logical consistency and 
probabilistic coherence. Elsewhere (Kusch 2019a; 2019b) I have urged a more radical 
version of epistemic voluntarism according to which consistency and coherence too 
are values that can vary in importance from stance to stance. The resulting position 
is obviously more radically relativist than van Fraassen’s. Be this as it may, it is worth 
mentioning that philosophers who have tried out the stance-idea have typically 
ended up accepting something of a relativistic stand-off between philosophical 
positions (cf. Chakravartty 2017; Dilthey 1911; Simmel 1900).  
 
V 
 
Virtues and Vices. I now turn to discussing Baghramian’s intriguing comments on the 
relationship between epistemic relativism on the one hand, and epistemic virtues or 
vices on the other hand. Baghramian starts from the observation that card-carrying 
relativists like Bloor, Code, Feyerabend, or Hans Kelsen (1948), frequently make the 
following two claims: first, that relativism motivates, or even embodies, certain 
epistemic virtues that everyone – relativist and absolutist – finds desirable; and, 
second, that absolutism tends to motivate, or even embody, certain epistemic vices 
that everyone finds undesirable. (pp. 6-10)  
 On Baghramian’s reading of these paradigmatic relativists, they take absolutism 
to be an ‘obvious vice’ that is best countered by relativism (p. 7). Relativists’ belief 
that ‘absolutism is an obvious vice’ is, as Baghramian sees it, underwritten by the 
idea that ‘political’, ‘religious’ and ‘philosophical absolutisms’ are closely 
intertwined. Baghramian supports her view with a passage from Kelsen:  
 
[Political absolutism] has in fact the unmistakable tendency to use 
[philosophical absolutism] as an ideological instrument. … [Moreover] almost 
all outstanding representatives of a relativistic philosophy were politically in 
favour of democracy, whereas followers of philosophical Absolutism, the 
great metaphysicians, were in favour of political absolutism and against 
democracy. (Kelsen 1948, pp. 909-911)  
 
Baghramian is not convinced. In her view the philosophical absolutisms of, say, Frege 
and Hegel are not vicious. She also reminds us that many progressive thinkers (like 
Chomsky) have been anti-relativists, and that some fascists (like Mussolini) called 
themselves ‘relativists’ (p. 8). 
 Relativists might regroup and focus less on the alleged vice of absolutism, and 
more on specific epistemic virtues. Baghramian notes that Code and Feyerabend in 
particular present tolerance, open-mindedness and fair-mindedness as virtues that 
come natural to the relativist. Baghramian sums up the relativist’s train of thought as 
follows: 
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What better way to give at least some credence to the ideas and beliefs of other 
people … than by accepting them as true or warranted relative to differing but 
equally legitimate contexts of assessment? (p. 9) 
 
Some relativist authors also claim to be the true champions of ‘intellectual curiosity’ 
or the true opponents of ‘intellectual rigidity’. Again this is so because ‘the relativist 
gives equal credence to the truth (rational acceptability, justificatory standards) of 
differing positions and beliefs’ (p. 9). Arguments in favour of a close link between 
relativism on the one hand, and ‘intellectual humility and modesty’ on the other 
hand, take an analogous route. Baghramian even considers the possibility that 
relativists might claim to be ideally placed to combat testimonial injustice: ‘the 
relativist stance, in the sense of equal validity, … will give credence to all testimony’ 
and thereby hear the voices of the marginalized (p. 11). 
 Baghramian rejects all of these proposals concerning a natural affinity between 
epistemic virtues and relativism. Relativism does not lead to open-mindedness since, 
for the relativist, her own beliefs are true ‘for herself’, and the points of views of 
others are true for them: ‘to each according her own epistemic stance’ (p. 10). This 
leaves everyone with their respective truths, and there is no need to ever transcend 
one’s own stance. To make matters worse, relativists tend to champion 
‘incommensurability’; and once incommensurability is accepted, communication 
between different frameworks becomes impossible. (p. 10-1) 
 Baghramian suggests a similar argument against a natural fit between humility 
and relativism. EQUAL VALIDITY means not only that my viewpoint is no better than 
any other; it also means that my viewpoint is no worse. It is easy to see that this line 
of thinking must end up very far from humility. No-one has anything to learn from 
occupants of other frameworks. And what goes for humility also applies to curiosity 
(pp. 11). 
 As if all this was not bad enough, Baghramian goes further by insisting that 
relativism is prone to encourage epistemic vices. In suggesting that many 
unresolvable disagreements are faultless, relativists undermine the ability to 
‘discriminate between good and bad, right and wrong, better and worse alternatives’ 
(p. 12). Relativists tend to lack conviction, to be irresolute, and to slide into 
‘epistemic insouciance’. The last-mentioned category has been introduced by 
Quassim Cassam (2018). He defines it as ‘a casual lack of concern about whether 
one’s beliefs have any basis in reality or are adequately supported by the best 
available evidence’ (2018: 1). Cassam links this vice to ‘post-truth politics’ and Harry 
Frankfurt’s little classic On Bullshit (2005). The bullshitter ‘is neither on the side of 
the true nor on the side of the false. … He does not care whether the things he says 
describe reality correctly’ (Frankfurt 2005: 55-6; Cassam 2018: 4). Needless to say, it 
is all too easy to find this personality type in our current political world.  
 
VI 
 
Replies. I now turn to some comments. I welcome reflection on the relationship 
between epistemic relativism and virtue epistemology, and Baghramian deserves 
credit for having opened up this interesting new testing ground for relativism and its 
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opponents. I also think it an excellent idea to connect the conception of 
philosophical positions as stances to the notion of virtues.  
 Going beyond Baghramian’s paper, one might ask whether the clash between 
two epistemic frameworks is not often best rendered as a confrontation between 
different sets of epistemic virtues – rather than as a conflict between epistemic 
norms or beliefs. Consider for instance the standard test-case of relativism-debates, 
the conflict between Galileo Galilei and Cardinal Bellarmine. Paul Boghossian 
describes their differences by saying that Bellarmine accepted, while Galileo 
rejected, an epistemic principle to the effect that Biblical revelation gives us 
knowledge about the heavens (Boghossian 2006).  
 The virtue-theoretical alternative would focus instead on the different epistemic 
virtues and vices Galileo and Bellarmine valued or detested most. It seems plausible 
to say that for Bellarmine ethical and religious virtues (like faith, hope, and love) 
interacted closely with epistemic values, and made him give special weight to 
intellectual humility in astronomical and biblical matters (Broderick 1961). Galileo 
was also deeply religious but in studying the natural world he put great emphasis on 
the epistemic virtues of curiosity, freedom from preconceptions, boldness and 
courage (Blackwell 1991). Of course, Bellarmine and Galileo ultimately also differed 
in their beliefs about the heavens, but perhaps these differing beliefs were the result 
of the exercise of conflicting virtues. Or perhaps the two men were stuck in a regress 
of sorts: they were unable to agree on facts since they disagreed on epistemic 
virtues; and they were unable to agree on epistemic virtues since they disagreed on 
the facts.5 
 I am also in Baghramian’s camp as concerns the links between philosophical 
relativism or absolutism on the one hand, and progressive, conservative, or 
dictatorial regimes on the other hand. It would be an interesting exercise to try to 
quantify the political allegiances of relativists and absolutists, but in the absence of 
such a study there is good reason to suspend judgment on this matter.  
 Turning from areas of agreement to more contentious issues, I struggle to 
concur with Baghramian’s comments on Hegel and Frege. She refers to these two 
philosophers as evidence for the claim that not all forms of absolutism can easily be 
characterized as vicious (p. 8). I shall discuss the two men in turn, and begin with 
Hegel. Needless to say, I will only have space here to make an initial case for further 
investigation of the issue. 
 I am a bit at a loss as to what would count as ‘vicious’ for Baghramian in this 
context. But the following count as vicious in my book: Hegel sought to legitimize the 
repressive Prussian monarchy by declaring Prussia to be the most developed state in 
world history; his conception of world-history naturally lent itself to a justification of 
colonialism; he declared women to be naturally subordinate to men; and he 
compared women to plants, governed by feeling, not reason. The fact that Hegel 
presented these views as part of a philosophical system capturing the absolute no 
doubt helped in giving them considerable political and intellectual weight (Hegel 
1970; 1971; 1991).  
 As far as Frege is concerned, I shall leave aside his notorious 1924 diary with its 
extreme right-wing political, misogynist and anti-Semitic views (Gabriel and Kienzler 
1996). Truth be told, I find it difficult to connect these views to Frege’s work in logic. 
But this does not let Frege escape scot-free. After all, there are first-rate logicians 
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who find Frege’s logical absolutism deeply problematic. For instance, in his intriguing 
paper ‘Logic and Reasoning’ (2008), Johan van Benthem describes Frege’s absolutist 
understanding of logic in this way: 
 
… logical consequence is an eternal relationship between propositions, firmly 
cleansed from any mud or blood stains, smells, or sounds that human inferences 
might have … in some eternal realm where the sun of Pure Reason never sets … 
(2008, p. 68) 
 
van Benthem goes on to argue that Fregean logical absolutism stood and stands in 
the way of logicians addressing a range of important topics that require a close 
interaction between logic, psychology and the social sciences. For van Benthem, and 
contrary to Frege, logic is the study of situational reasoning, often involving multi-
agent interaction and group phenomena. Interestingly enough, there is a strong 
pluralism – if not relativism – in van Benthem’s position: 
 
My view is that there remains one logic, but not in any particular definition of 
logical consequence, or any favoured logical system. The unity of logic, like that 
of other creative disciplines, resides in the mentality of its practitioners, and 
their modus operandi. (2008, p. 82) 
 
Of course, van Benthem is just one of many influential voices in logic today. But it is 
noteworthy that logicians disagree over the question whether Frege’s absolutism is 
unproblematic. 
 Moving on from absolutism in general to epistemic virtues and vices, I am struck 
that in investigating the links between relativism, virtues and vices, Baghramian 
restricts her attention only to the most implausible versions of relativism, that is, 
versions committed to EQUAL VALIDITY and other unsavoury ideas. Moreover, I do 
not believe that relativism or absolutism can be distinguished in terms of virtues or 
vices like open-mindedness, tolerance, courage, steadfastness, or insouciance. There 
are many absolutists who display these virtues and vices, and many absolutists who 
do not. And the same is true for relativists. Neither absolutism nor relativism has a 
special claim to these virtues, and neither absolutism nor relativism is guilty of 
fostering these vices.6 This is a big claim, and I will be able to offer only scant 
evidence. 
 Consider tolerance for example. Surely the absolutist can make it a matter of 
absolute principle to tolerate other people’s views that contradict her own, and she 
can do so even while taking her own respective beliefs to be absolutely true. Or the 
absolutist might be a fallibilist or ‘gradualist’ by assuming that the beliefs of 
humankind will be absolutely true only in the long run. Even an absolutist skepticism 
might underwrite tolerance. The absolutist skeptic denies that we can ever discover 
the absolute truths that are ‘there anyway’.  
 Relativism too can give support to tolerance, and without any appeal to EQUAL 
VALIDITY. Relativist tolerance might simply be motivated by the thoughts, first, that 
one’s own beliefs are true or justified only relative to a framework of standards, 
virtues or values, and second, that similar such frameworks – especially those in the 
sciences – have frequently been overthrown in the past. Honestly facing up to the 
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existing problems in her own web of beliefs, and system of standards, the relativist 
might well have good reason to learn from others and even when their webs and 
systems are incompatible with her own. Not even a commitment to 
incommensurability need undermine relativist tolerance, at least not if we 
understand incommensurability with Kuhn, Feyerabend and van Fraassen not as 
something which makes communication impossible but merely as a phenomenon 
that makes communication difficult and challenging. 
 As we saw above, Baghramian goes out of her way to show that relativism 
undermines rather than supports open-mindedness. Her central premise in so 
arguing is that, for the relativist, all his views are true-for-him, and all others’ views 
are true-for-them. And yet, if the relativist’s views are already true-for-him, he has 
no reason to pay attention to what others believe. And thus there is no need for the 
relativist to ever transcend his own framework, there is no need for the relativist to 
be open-minded. The argument is valid, but the premise is too uncharitable for 
comfort. Baghramian ties the relativist to an implausible principle of self-vindication: 
 
(SELF-VINDICATION) For every framework, all beliefs held by people using this 
framework are true relative to this framework.  
 
At one stage she even commits relativism to a relativistic form of infallibilism (p.11): 
 
(INFALLIBILISM) S’s believing that p guarantees that p is true for S. 
 
Did any relativist ever hold this view? Perhaps Protagoras did, but I cannot think of 
anyone doing so in the realm of epistemology ever since. Sensible relativists surely 
allow that one may be mistaken in one’s judgement that a given belief is justified (by 
one’s standards). Sensible relativists leave room for learning and for recognizing that 
their standards are inconsistent either with each other or with one of their beliefs, 
preferences or desires. Sensible relativists are thus ready to replace standards, and 
to incorporate standards or beliefs from other frameworks. Of course, in so doing, 
the relativist’s epistemic actions are guided by (some) of her current standards. 
 It follows that, just like the absolutist, so also the relativist can be open-minded, 
and ready to ‘transcend her own standpoint’, if that means coming to realize – using 
one’s own standpoint – that this standpoint does not work as well as one would like 
it to work. To make it a matter of definition that relativists cannot do so, is to deny 
that self-proclaimed relativists like Bloor, Code, Feyerabend or Field really deserve to 
be called ‘relativists’. But again, if these authors do not qualify, who does? 
 Baghramian’s case against relativistic humility and curiosity has the same 
problematic structure as her discussion of relativistic open-mindedness. Again the 
relativist is committed to EQUAL VALIDITY and SELF-VINDICATION, and again the 
conclusion is that the relativist has no reason to pay attention to the views of others. 
 Baghramian’s attempts to show that relativism lacks epistemic virtues all 
assume that relativism is epistemologically vicious: a fully relativistic viewpoint has 
to be intolerant, close-minded, and rigid. As if this was not bad enough, Baghramian 
also ties relativism to other, further epistemic vices such as lack of conviction or 
epistemic insouciance. One might wonder whether she does not overshoot the 
target here: after all, she ends up committing the relativist to character-dispositions 
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that are incompatible. Thus when rejecting the relativists’ claim to open-
mindedness, she paints them as rigid, close-minded, and inflexible. But later, when 
reflecting on epistemic vices, she faults relativists for lacking conviction altogether. 
Perhaps these tensions do not worry Baghramian. Perhaps she can simply respond 
by saying: ‘So much the worse for relativists! They cannot even develop a coherent 
set of dispositions.’  
 Baghramian is not alone of course in linking relativism to phenomena of ‘post-
truth’, ‘post-fact’, or ‘truth decay’ in contemporary political culture, and especially in 
the U.S. Her main focus is on ‘epistemic insouciance’. Her thought seems to be that 
since the relativist does not believe in absolute truth, he must end up thinking that 
‘anything goes’. And the person believing that anything goes naturally concludes that 
there is little point in finding out how things really are, little point to believe in facts, 
little point to rationally argue, and little point to relying on scientific experts’ 
testimony. Instead, there is every reason to do and say whatever one feels like, and 
whatever serves one’s short-term political or other interests. In other words, for 
Baghramian relativism is the raison d'être of politicians like Boris Johnson and 
Donald Trump. Or, as Daniel Dennett puts it in a memorable phrase: relativists 
should finally own up to the ‘evil’ they have caused (Cadwalladr 2017). 
 There is no denying that this analysis has become a familiar trope in much 
contemporary critique of post-truth politics. But is it true? The key question seems 
to be how we get from relativism to ‘anything goes’. This could be discussed again in 
terms of EQUAL VALIDITY, but here I want to focus on a different aspect. The 
shortest route from relativism to ‘anything goes’ is to add a further element to 
relativism, namely ARBITRARY CHOICE:  
 
(ARBITRARY CHOICE) Assume an epistemic subject S, information I, known to S, 
and a belief B that S would like to hold. S is epistemically blameless if S picks 
such epistemic standards E as make holding B epistemically rational. The choice 
of E is unconstrained by other epistemic standards.  
 
Paul Boghossian and Crispin Wright see ARBITRARY CHOICE as an essential element 
in epistemic relativism (Boghossian 2001, pp. 30-1; Wright 2008, p. 388). And if 
relativists are committed to ARBITRARY CHOICE then it is natural for them to slide 
into insouciance. If you can make anything come out rational, all efforts to 
rationalize our beliefs will seem superfluous and silly. One might as well make it all 
up. All true – but, it seems to me irrelevant to the assessment of, say, the relativistic 
views of Bloor, Code, Feyerabend, Field (or my own). None of these authors accepts 
ARBITRARY CHOICE, not even Feyerabend. Feyerabend’s slogan ‘anything goes’ does 
not say: do whatever you like, it’s all justifiable; it says that all principles of scientific 
rationality have exceptions, such that it is sometimes rationally defensible – in order 
to achieve scientific progress – to intentionally go against them.  
 Bloor is not guilty of ARBITRARY CHOICE either, though he defends a principle 
that, read superficially, looks similar (Barnes and Bloor 1982):  
 
(CONTINGENT CHOICE) Assume an epistemic subject S, and information I, known 
to S. Which beliefs S will take to be rationally permissible or obligatory will 
depend upon two interrelated sets of contingencies: the locally, socially and 
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historically entrenched and available epistemic standards E and the locally 
operative goals, values and interests of S and others in S’s community.  
 
This is not an epistemic principle telling epistemic subjects how to act; it is a 
descriptive claim and causal hypothesis about how epistemic communities function. 
It does not give us a licence to rationalize whatever we want to rationalize. It tells us 
how we reason when trying to convince one another. Reflecting on CONTINGENT 
CHOICE can help us understand what is wrong about epistemic insouciance: the 
bullshitter follows the absolutist critics of relativism in conflating contingency with 
arbitrariness. He thinks that unless there are absolutes and metaphysical necessities, 
nothing really matters. If there are no absolutes, everything is permitted. It’s 
Karamazov all over again. 
 What can relativists do to defend our societies against the bullshitters? Should 
they go back to absolutism? Of course, relativists will answer ‘no’. To go back to 
absolutism in order to defeat bullshitters would itself be to operate on the basis of 
ARBITRARY CHOICE. And this is not how epistemology functions in most of our 
philosophical traditions. Epistemology is not the slave of our political aspirations. We 
cannot pick our epistemic positions so as to defeat Johnson and Trump. This is not 
how we think about knowledge.  
 CONTINGENT CHOICE directs our attention elsewhere: we need to bring 
together and defend anew hard-won, but entrenched standards of virtuous 
epistemic conduct; we need to remind each other how and why these standards 
have proven useful in our past; and we need to update these standards in light of 
our current intellectual challenges. And, most of all, we need to understand the 
changes in our social fabric: the increasing polarisations (economic, political, ethnic) 
in our Western societies, the (at least initially) unintended blurring of the divide 
between opinion and fact in old and new media, or the decline in respect for, and 
trust in, politicians or the press (Kavanagh and Rich 2018). To defeat the bullshitters 
we need to dig deeper and deeper into these contingencies, these local and variable 
structures and values.  
 
VII 
 
Conclusion. In this paper I have tried to comment on central themes of Baghramian’s 
‘The Virtues of Relativism’. I have focused on EQUAL VALIDITY, stances, epistemic 
virtues and vices. I am only too aware that I have no more than scratched the 
surface of these complex issues. But I hope to have said enough to motivate further 
– and perhaps even a little more charitable – reflections on the relativist position.7 
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Footnote 
 
1 David Bloor and Barry Barnes flesh this out as follows: ‘For the relativist there is no 
sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as 
distinct from merely locally accepted as such. … he thinks that there are no context-
free or super-cultural norms of rationality …’ (Barnes and Bloor 1982: 27). Barnes 
and Bloor’s ‘really rational’ is another expression for my ‘absolutely correct.’ 
 
2 As we shall see below, very strong forms of EQUAL VALIDITY play an essential role 
in Baghramian’s argument against the virtues of relativism. 
 
3 Baghramian’s discussion of the virtues of absolutism seem to commit her to this 
view, even though she never states it explicitly.  
 
4 Put differently, the absolutist and relativist differ on the question of the extent to 
which there are neutral modes of assessment of stances. As well shall see later, 
Baghramian assumes that there are stance-neutral standards of virtue that allow us 
to adjudicate between the relativist and absolutist stances. The relativist insists that 
virtues too can only be understood and assessed relative to frameworks or stances. 
 
5 It is exactly such regress that Baghramian seems to ignore. She assumes that 
virtues form a neutral background for assessing relativism and absolutism. 
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6 I take this to be a disagreement between Baghramian and me. I take her to align 
relativism with epistemic vices, and to reject the suggestion that a relativist could do 
embody epistemic virtues. 
 
7 For comments I am grateful to Delia Belleri and Guy Longworth. -- Work on this 
paper was supported by ERC Advanced Grant #339382. 
